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Autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) and social anxiety disorder (SAD) are both characterized by social dysfunction, but no study to date has compared
neural responses to social rewards in ASDs and SAD. Neural responses during social and non-social reward anticipation and outcomes were examined in
individuals with ASD (n¼16), SAD (n¼15) and a control group (n¼19) via functional magnetic resonance imaging. Analyses modeling all three groups
revealed increased nucleus accumbens (NAc) activation in SAD relative to ASD during monetary reward anticipation, whereas both the SAD and ASD
group demonstrated decreased bilateral NAc activation relative to the control group during social reward anticipation. During reward outcomes, the SAD
group did not differ significantly from the other two groups in ventromedial prefrontal cortex activation to either reward type. Analyses comparing only
the ASD and SAD groups revealed greater bilateral amygdala activation to social rewards in SAD relative to ASD during both anticipation and outcome
phases, and the magnitude of left amygdala hyperactivation in the SAD group during social reward anticipation was significantly correlated with the
severity of trait anxiety symptoms. Results suggest reward network dysfunction to both monetary and social rewards in SAD and ASD during reward
anticipation and outcomes, but that NAc hypoactivation during monetary reward anticipation differentiates ASD from SAD.
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INTRODUCTION
Given that a number of psychiatric disorders are characterized by
social deficits that contribute significantly to morbidity, deficits in
social processing represent a promising candidate for mechanistic
research that may elucidate the etiology of multiple forms of
psychopathology. Social anxiety disorder (SAD) and autism spectrum
disorders (ASDs) are two such disorders, and studies contrasting these
disorders may provide a means for identifying processes that drive
phenotypic specificity. Consistent with the objectives of NIMHs
Research Domain Criteria project (‘RDoC’, see http://www.nimh.nih.
gov/research-funding/rdoc.shtml) to identify endophenotypes that po-
tentially cut across traditional diagnostic boundaries (Insel and
Cuthbert, 2009; Miller, 2010), in the present study we addressed
common and unique patterns of brain activity during different aspects
of social and non-social reward processing in SAD and ASD, with the
ultimate long-term goal to help refine classification and aid in the
development of empirically derived approaches to treatment for
these conditions (Hasler et al., 2004; Carter, 2005; Jacob et al., 2009).
There is emerging consensus that ASDs are characterized by altered
function of frontostriatal brain circuitry in response to rewards
(Scott-Van Zeeland et al., 2010; Demurie et al., 2011; Kohls et al.,
2011; Larson et al., 2011; Dichter et al., 2012b). A number of
studies have further suggested that such deficits encompass responses
to social rewards, a pattern hypothesized to reflect diminished inter-
est in and pleasure from social activity in ASDs (Scott-Van Zeeland
et al., 2010; Kohls et al., 2011; Dichter et al., 2012c). Recent reviews of
this topic have highlighted that disrupted neural mechanisms mediat-
ing social motivation may be causally linked to social deficits in ASDs
(Kohls et al., 2012), may provide a mechanistic account of disrupted
social attention in ASDs (Dawson et al., 2012) and may provide etio-
logic insights into the poor development of social skills and social
cognition in ASDs (Chevallier et al., 2012). However, it is not clear
whether reward circuitry dysfunction to social stimuli is specific to
ASDs or whether this pattern of dysfunction is present in other dis-
orders characterized by social impairments.
Reward processing is mediated in large part by dense dopaminergic
projections originating from the ventral tegmental area (VTA) that
project to the striatum, orbitofrontal cortex, ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (vmPFC) and the anterior cingulate cortex, forming a mesolim-
bic dopamine pathway sensitive to the magnitude and probability of
reward (Swerdlow and Koob, 1987; Berridge and Robinson, 1998,
2003; Schultz, 1998, 2000; Ikemoto and Panksepp, 1999; Berridge
and Kringelbach, 2008; Berridge et al., 2009). Reward-predictive
dopamine bursts originating in VTA send signals to the striatum,
including the nucleus accumbens (NAc), that code incentive motiv-
ation thought to underlie approach behaviors to salient goals (Knutson
et al., 2001; Knutson and Cooper, 2005; Kim et al., 2006; Bjork and
Hommer, 2007; Forbes et al., 2009), and emerging evidence suggests
that the neural circuits that mediate reward processing may have
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evolved, at least in part, to facilitate social attachment (Insel, 2003;
Douglas et al., 2004; Trezza et al., 2011). Consistent with this
conceptualization, social interaction mobilizes the same mesolimbic
network that is active while processing non-social rewards such as
food, money, sex and drugs of addiction (Koob and Le Moal, 1997;
Schultz, 1997; Zink et al., 2004; McClure et al., 2007; Spreckelmeyer
et al., 2009). Furthermore, functioning of the mesolimbic circuit in the
context of positive stimuli is associated with high subjective valuation,
incentive salience and motivation (Smith et al., 2011). Therefore,
reward mechanisms may serve to encode and consolidate positive
memories of social experiences, facilitating social functioning abilities
hypothesized to be impaired in ASD (Dawson et al., 1998, 2005;
Schultz, 2005).
The primary goal of the current study was to compare the neural
correlates of social and non-social reward processing in ASD and SAD,
a psychiatric disorder also characterized by impaired social functioning
though specifically with respect to fear of negative social evaluation
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994). A pathognomonic feature of
SAD, relative to other anxiety disorders, is the specificity of symptoms
of anxious arousal in response to social interactions (Brown et al.,
1998; Kashdan, 2004; Etkin and Wager, 2007; Goldin et al., 2009).
Functional neuroimaging studies of SAD indicate the centrality of
amygdala dysfunction in this disorder (Freitas-Ferrari et al., 2010;
Shin and Liberzon, 2010). However, it is not known whether impaired
social functioning in SAD potentially reflects aberrant reward network
engagement in response to social rewards or whether such responses
may more generally reflect a pattern of dysfunctional activation to
non-social and social rewards. Additionally, despite potential simila-
rities with respect to reward processing deficits in SAD and ASD, no
neuroimaging study to date has examined reward circuitry function in
SAD in comparison to ASD.
We recently reported that ASD is characterized by aberrant frontos-
triatal responses while processing both non-social and social rewards.
Specifically, we found decreased NAc activation during monetary
reward anticipation and decreased vmPFC activation during monetary
reward outcomes in ASD, increased amygdala activation during social
reward anticipation in ASD and increased vmPFC activation while
processing non-social rewards linked to circumscribed interests in
ASD (Dichter et al., 2012b, 2012c). These findings dovetail with
other ASD studies reporting decreased left anterior cingulate gyrus
and left midfrontal gyrus activation to rewards during sustained atten-
tion (Schmitz et al., 2008), ventral striatal hypoactivation during social
and non-social learning (Scott-Van Zeeland et al., 2010), ventral stri-
atal hypoactivation to monetary rewards and amygdala and anterior
cingulate cortex hypoactivation to monetary and social rewards (Kohls
et al., 2013) and increased bilateral insula and anterior cingulate cortex
activation to images of food (Cascio et al., 2012) in ASDs. In the
present study, we extend this line of research by comparing neural
responses during social and monetary reward anticipation and out-
comes in individuals with SAD to individuals with ASD and control
participants.
Primary regions of interest included the NAc during the anticipation
phase of the task and the vmPFC during the outcome phase of the task
because of the centrality of these regions to reward anticipation and
outcomes, respectively (Knutson et al., 2003; Haber and Knutson,
2010). Additionally, the amygdala was a region of interest given that:
(i) amygdala dysfunction has been linked to social impairments in SAD
in response to emotional (Freitas-Ferrari et al., 2010; Shin and
Liberzon, 2010) and neutral (Birbaumer et al., 1998; Cooney et al.,
2006) faces, (ii) the amygdala responds to rewarding input in certain
contexts (Gottfried et al., 2003; Shabel and Janak, et al., 2009) and
(iii) ASD is characterized by amygdala hyperactivation during social
reward anticipation (Dichter et al., 2012c).
Given our previous findings of reward circuitry dysfunction in ASD
to monetary and social rewards (Dichter et al., 2012b, 2012c) and
research indicating that SAD is characterized by specific deficits in
social functioning (Brown et al., 1998; Kashdan, 2004; Goldin et al.,
2009), our central hypothesis was that the SAD group would be char-
acterized by reward circuitry dysfunction to social, but not monetary,
rewards relative to controls and would be differentiated from ASD on
the basis of unimpaired reward circuitry dysfunction in response to
monetary reward. Finally, given the framework of the present study
that reward network dysfunction to social rewards may be mechanis-
tically linked to the expression of social deficits in SAD, we predicted
that neural responses to social rewards would predict the degree of
social deficits in the SAD group.
METHODS
Participants
Inclusion/exclusion criteria for neurotypical control participants and
participants with ASD as well as functional magnetic resonance ima-
ging (fMRI) results comparing these two groups have been reported
previously (Dichter et al., 2012c). All participants had normal or cor-
rected to normal vision and no history of neurological problems.
Nineteen right-handed control participants [six female; mean (s.d.)
age: 25.3 (7.0)] were recruited from lists of control samples maintained
by the Duke-UNC Brain Imaging and Analysis Center. Control par-
ticipants were not taking any psychotropic medications at the time of
scanning. The high-functioning ASD group included 16 right-handed
participants [2 female; mean (s.d.) age: 26.0 (9.1); 2 diagnosed with
Asperger’s Disorder and 14 with High Functioning Autism] and were
recruited via the Autism Subject Registry maintained through the UNC
Carolina Institute for Developmental Disabilities. Exclusion criteria for
the ASD group included a history of medical conditions associated
with autism, including Fragile X syndrome, tuberous sclerosis, neuro-
fibromatosis, phenylketouria, epilepsy and gross brain injury, full-scale
intelligence <80 or MRI contraindications. Seven ASD participants
were not taking psychotropic medications; of the remaining nine,
four were taking Abilify, one was taking Adderall, one was taking
Celexa, one was taking Prozac, one was taking Risperdal and one
was taking both Adderall and Prozac. Diagnoses of ASD were based
on a history of clinical diagnosis confirmed by proband assessment by
a research reliable assessor via the Autism Diagnostic Observation
Schedule (ADOS-G) (Lord et al., 2000) with standard clinical algo-
rithm cutoffs.
The SAD group was recruited via online ads in Chapel Hill and
Durham and included 15 participants [6 female; mean (s.d.): 26.9
(5.3)]. Individuals with SAD were required to meet DSM-IV criteria
for current SAD based on the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for
DSM-IV (Di Nardo et al., 1994), administered by a doctoral level
interviewer reliable with other interviewers at Kappa¼ 0.80 or above.
SAD participants had Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS)
(Liebowitz, 1987) scores 60 on the social fear subscale. Thirteen
SAD participants were not taking psychotropic medication; one was
taking Prozac and one was taking Celexa. Participants consented to a
protocol approved by the local Human Investigations Committees at
both UNC-Chapel Hill and Duke University Medical Center and were
paid between $35 and $45 for the imaging portion of the study.
Participants completed a mock scan prior to imaging.
Participants completed: (i) The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of
Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999) [one ASD participant completed
the Leiter-R (Roid and Miller, 1997) instead of the WASI]; (ii) the
Autism Quotient (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), to assess the overall se-
verity of autism symptoms as well as to verify that the neurotypical and
SAD groups did not have significant autistic symptoms and (iii) the
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Social Responsiveness Scale, a continuous measure of autism symptom
severity (Constantino et al., 2003) (see Table 1). The SAD group, but
not the other two groups, completed the trait scale of the State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T) (Knight et al., 1983) and the LSAS, which
are not validated for use with ASD populations. Groups did not differ
in age, F(48)¼ 0.24; P > 0.80, or gender distribution, 2(1)¼ 1.58,
P > 0.21.
fMRI task
The fMRI task was an incentive delay task (Knutson et al., 2000)
modified such that on alternating runs money and pictures of neutral
faces were presented as rewards. All runs were ‘win versions’ (i.e.
money or faces could be won or not won, but could not be lost).
Three runs were modified such that trial ‘wins’ resulted in the pres-
entation of a static image of a face rather than monetary gain. Face
stimuli were neutral expression, closed mouth images selected from
the NimStim set of facial expressions (Tottenham et al., 2009). Run
types (i.e. ‘money runs’ or ‘face runs’) were presented in alternating
order and the run type presented first was counter-balanced across
participants. Runs began with a 10 s instructional screen indicating
the forthcoming run type. The two reward types (i.e. money and
faces) were segregated by run to minimize the number of cues to be
memorized.
Task conditions and trial timings are summarized in Figure 1. Each
trial consisted of the following: (i) a 2000 ms cue indicating whether
adequately quick responses to the bulls-eye would result in a ‘win’ (a tri-
angle) or not (a circle); (ii) a 2000–2500 ms crosshair fixation; (iii) a
target bulls-eye presented for up to 500 ms that required a speeded
button press; (iv) 3000 ms of feedback that indicated whether that trial
was a ‘win’ or not, with wins accompanied by either an image of money
or of a face and (v) a variable length ITI crosshair presented such that
the total duration of each trial was 12 s. Trial types (i.e. potential win or
no potential win) were aperiodic and pseudorandomly ordered. Each
8 min run contained 40 trials, of which 20 were potential win trials.
During money runs, participants won $1 per trial if bulls-eye re-
sponses were adequately quick. During face runs, participants viewed a
face image if bulls-eye responses were adequately quick. Coincident
with feedback, cumulative win totals were presented. Participants
were instructed to respond to all target bulls-eyes as quickly as possible
to win on as many trials as possible, and win or non-win outcomes
were contingent on reaction times (RTs). The task was adaptive such
that participants were successful on two-thirds of trials, regardless of
individual differences in RTs (confirmed via inspection of behavioral
data collected during scanning).
Standard administration of incentive delay tasks involves showing
participants rewards that may be won prior to scanning (Knutson
et al., 2001). Consistent with this procedure, participants were
shown the money they could win based on scanner task performance
and were informed that they would receive the total amount of money
won during the scan. Prior to scanning, participants rated face stimuli
on the dimensions of valence and arousal. Stimuli were presented
using E-Prime presentation software version 1.1 (Psychology
Software Tools Inc., Pittsburgh, PA, USA) and displayed through
magnet-compatible goggles (Resonance Technology, Inc., Northridge,
CA, USA).
Imaging methods
Scanning was performed on a General Electric Health Technologies,
3 T Signa Excite HD scanner system with 50 mT/m gradients (General
Electric, Waukesha, WI, USA). Head movement was restricted using
foam cushions. An eight-channel head coil was used for parallel ima-
ging. Thirty high-resolution images were acquired using a 3D fast
SPGR pulse sequence (TR¼ 7.33 ms; TE¼ 3.03 ms; FOV¼ 22 cm;
image matrix¼ 2562; voxel size¼ 0.85 mm 0.85 mm 3.80 mm)
and used for co-registration with the functional data. These structural
images were aligned in the near axial plane defined by the anterior and
posterior commissures. Whole-brain functional images consisted of 30
slices parallel to the AC–PC plane using a BOLD-sensitive
gradient-echo EPI sequence with higher order shimming, at TR of
2000 ms (TE: 30 ms; FOV: 22 cm; isotropic voxel size:
3.43 3.43 4.00; flip angle 778). Runs began with four discarded
RF excitations to allow for steady state equilibrium.
Imaging data analysis
Functional data were preprocessed using FSL version 4.1.4 [Oxford
Centre for Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Brain
(FMRIB), Oxford University, UK]. Preprocessing was applied in the
following steps: (i) brain extraction (Smith et al., 2004), (ii) motion
correction using MCFLIRT (Smith, 2002), (iii) spatial smoothing using
a Gaussian kernel of FWHM 5 mm, (iv) mean-based intensity normal-
ization of all volumes by the same factor and (v) high-pass filtering
Table 1 Mean (s.d.) age and symptom profiles
Autism (n¼ 16) SAD (n¼ 15) Control (n¼ 19) Group comparison P-values
Control-ASD ASD-SAD Control-SAD
Age 26.0 (9.1) 26.9 (5.3) 25.3 (7.0) 0.95 0.89 0.80
No. of female 2 6 6 0.10 0.02 0.18
ADOS Comm 6.1 (5.5) 0.6 (0.9) – – <0.001 –
ADOS SI 8.7 (2.2) 1.5 (1.7) – – <0.0001 –
ADOS SBRI 2.25 (1.8) 0.2 (0.4) – – <0.001 –
WASI* 109.9 (19.6) 116.4 (9.38) 127.0 (7.9) <0.01 0.28 <0.01
AQ total score 24.8 (12.7) 22.9 (5.85) 12.4 (5.1) <0.0001 0.61 <0.0001
RBS-R total score 28.3 (25.7) 13.5 (10.94) 3.6 (4.6) <0.001 0.06 <0.01
SRS total score 79.4 (22.0) 147.0 (16.5) 57.1 (13.7) <0.01 <0.01 <0.0001
LSAS total – 133.0 (13.24) –
LSAS fear subscale – 67.1 (6.89) –
LSAS avoidance subscale – 66.3 (7.55) –
STAI-T – 46.53 (3.44) –
*One ASD participant completed the Leiter-R (Roid and Miller, 1997) instead of the WASI and is not included in this average.
WASI, Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (Wechsler, 1999); RBS-R, The Repetitive Behavior Scale-Revised (Bodfish et al., 1999; Lam and Aman, 2007); AQ, the Autism Quotient (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001);
SRS, Social Responsiveness Scale (Constantino et al., 2003); LSAS, Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (Liebowitz, 1987); STAI-T: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Knight et al., 1983); ADOS: Autism Diagnostic
Observation Schedule.
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(Jenkinson et al., 2002). Functional images were co-registered to struc-
tural images in native space, and structural images were normalized
into a standard stereotaxic space (Montreal Neurological Institute) for
intersubject comparison. The same transformation matrices used for
structural-to-standard transformations were then used for
functional-to-standard space transformations of co-registered func-
tional images. All registrations were carried out using an intermodal
registration tool (Jenkinson et al., 2002; Smith et al., 2004). Voxel-wise
temporal autocorrelation was estimated and corrected using FMRIB’s
Improved Linear Model (Jenkinson and Smith, 2001).
Onset times of events were used to model a signal response contain-
ing a regressor for each response type, which was convolved with a
double- function to model the hemodynamic response of the entire
duration of the anticipation and outcome phases of the task. Model
fitting generated whole-brain images of parameter estimates and vari-
ances, representing average signal change from baseline. Group-wise
activation and deactivation images were calculated by a mixed effects
higher level analysis using Bayesian estimation techniques, FMRIB
Local Analysis of Mixed Effects (Woolrich et al., 2001) with cluster
mean threshold of at least Z > 2.3 and a cluster-corrected significance
threshold of P < 0.05 (FLAME 1þ 2) (Beckmann et al., 2003).
Imaging data analytic strategy
The primary omnibus method of fMRI data analysis was a 3 (Group:
ASD, SAD, Control) 2 (Reward type: Money, Faces) mixed analysis
of variance (ANOVA) model applied separately for the anticipatory
and outcome phases of the task, each modeled against an implicit
baseline (the anticipatory phase modeled only ‘potential win’ trials
and the outcome phase modeled only successful ‘potential win’ trials).
Significant clusters were further evaluated by extracting subject- and
condition-specific signal intensity coefficients to evaluate simple ef-
fects. This approach allowed us to identify activations that potentially
overlapped between groups (i.e. common variation). Supplementary
analyses excluded controls and modeled SAD vs ASD only to highlight
activations that were specific to SAD relative to ASD.
Activation localizations were based on Harvard–Oxford cortical and
subcortical structural probabilistic atlases as implemented in FSLView
version 3.0. Because groups differed in estimated intelligence, models
were evaluated that included full-scale estimated intelligence as a cov-
ariate. These analyses yielded highly similar results, and thus results
without these covariates are presented for comparison with other stu-
dies of reward network function in ASD that did not covary these
variables (Schmitz et al., 2008; Scott-Van Zeeland et al., 2010).
Finally, relations between neural responses to rewards and social
anxiety symptoms from the LSAS and STAI-T were assessed in the
SAD group alone (associations between neural responses to rewards
and autism symptoms in the ASD group have been reported previously
(Dichter et al., 2012c)) by using group-level activation maps to extract
mean subject-specific parameter estimates that were then analyzed in
SAS 9.2 (Cary, NC, USA). For these exploratory correlational analyses,
we did not correct for multiple comparisons.
RESULTS
Behavioral results
In-scanner RTs to task bulls-eyes are depicted in Figure 2 and were
compared via a 3 (Group: ASD, SAD, Control) 2 (Trial Type: Money
potential win, Money non-potential win, Faces potential win, Faces
non-potential win) mixed ANOVA, followed by two GroupTrial
Type mixed ANOVAs comparing the SAD group to both other
groups. The ANOVA including all three groups yielded no
Group Stimulus Type interaction, F(2,48)¼ 0.40, P > 0.85, no main
effect of Group, F(2,48)¼ 0.44, P > 0.60, but a main effect for Reward
Type, F(1,48)¼ 6.67, P < 0.02, reflecting faster RTs overall on money
trials relative to face trials. There was no main effect of Group for SAD
vs controls, F(1,33)¼ 0.48, P > 0.45, or SAD vs ASD, F(1,34)¼ 0.04,
P > 0.80. Exploratory between-groups t-tests comparing groups on all
trial types revealed no significant group differences, Ps > 20.
Valence and arousal ratings of faces were examined by separate 3
(Group: ASD, SAD, Control) ANOVAs as well as t-tests comparing the
SAD group to the two other groups. Analysis of valence ratings yielded
no main effect of Group, F(1,48)¼ 0.243, P¼ 0.78, or significant dif-
ferences between the SAD group and the two other groups, Ps > 0.30.
Analysis of arousal ratings yielded no main effect of group,
Fig. 1 Incentive delay task. Participants alternated ‘money’ and ‘face’ reward runs, denoted by an instructional screen at the start of each run. Each trial consisted of a cue (i.e. a triangle indicated an incentive
trial, a circle indicated a non-incentive trial), an anticipatory delay, a target and outcome feedback.
370 SCAN (2014) J. A.Richey et al.
F(1,48)¼ 1.20, P¼ 0.31, or significant differences between the SAD
group and the two other groups, Ps > 0.20.
fMRI results
Three-group analysis, anticipatory phase
During the anticipatory phase of the task, a whole-brain 3 (Group:
ASD, SAD, Control) 2 (Reward Type: Money, Faces) analysis re-
vealed significant interactions in bilateral NAc [Right: F(50)¼ 5.35,
P < 0.001; Left: F(50)¼ 5.35 P < 0.001, see Figure 3]. To assess the
nature of these interactions, subject- and condition-specific signal in-
tensity values were extracted from these two NAc clusters to assess
simple effects. This revealed that during anticipation of monetary re-
wards, SAD did not differ from controls in NAc activation
(Right: > 0.90; Left: P > 0.60), but did activate NAc more than the
ASD group (Right: P < 0.01; Left: P¼ 0.06), although the difference
between ASD and SAD in left NAc was at the level of a trend.
During anticipation of social rewards, the NAc showed significantly
less activation in both SAD (Right: P < 0.05; Left: P¼ 0.05) and ASD
(Right: P¼ 0.05; Left: P < 0.05), relative to controls. Within-group
comparisons revealed no significant differences in NAc activation be-
tween face and monetary conditions for any group. Results of all pair-
wise comparisons for anticipatory phase data are presented in Table 2,
as well as activation patterns and coordinates of all significant clusters.
Fig. 2 Left: Average valence and arousal ratings of faces. Valence¼ 0 (extremely unpleasant) toþ 8 (extremely pleasant); Arousal¼ 0 (not at all aroused) toþ 8 (extremely aroused). Right: Average reaction
times during face and money conditions for both potential reward (‘Rew’) and non potential reward (‘Non’) trials. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
Fig. 3 Brain areas showing significant Group (ASD, SAD, Control) Reward Type (Money, Faces) interactions during the anticipatory phase of the task. The bar graphs depict parameter estimates by group and
trial type in the significant NAc clusters.
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Supplementary analyses examined the 3 (Group: ASD, SAD,
Control) 2 (Reward Type: Money, Faces) interaction term during
the anticipatory phase of the task for the contrast of potential win vs
non-potential win trials. As depicted in Supplementary Figure S1, this
approach also yielded significant interaction clusters in bilateral NAc.
However, subject- and condition-specific signal intensity values
extracted from these NAc cluster did not yield any significant
between-groups or between-conditions differences other than larger
responses in controls to money than face rewards.
Our previous article directly comparing these ASD and control
sample reported findings at a corrected threshold of Z > 2.3 (Dichter
et al., 2012c). Supplementary Figure S2 depicts results of the 3 (Group:
ASD, SAD, Control) 2 (Reward Type: Money, Faces) interaction
term in an axial slice through bilateral NAc at this same corrected
threshold of Z > 2.3. As is evident from this figure, the resulting cluster
that subsumes bilateral NAc is so large that meaningful interpretation
of group- and condition-specific signal intensities from this cluster is
not possible.
Three-group analysis, outcome phase
During the outcome phase of the task, a GroupReward Type model
revealed a significant interaction in vmPFC (see Figure 4; denoted
Subcallosal Cortex [x,y,z¼ 0.91, 15.97, 4.20] in Table 3). Once
again, subject- and condition-specific signal intensity values were ex-
tracted from this cluster to assess simple effects, which revealed no
significant difference between SAD and ASD or control groups
during social (Ps > 0.38) or monetary (Ps > 0.54) reward outcomes
(see Table 3). However, the SAD group demonstrated relatively
decreased vmPFC activation to face reward outcomes than monetary
reward outcomes, t(14)¼ 4.09, P < 0.001. No other within-group com-
parisons were significant (Ps > 0.05).
Supplementary analyses considered responses during the outcome
phase of the task for successful vs non-successful trials. As depicted in
Supplementary Figure S3, this approach yielded a significant inter-
action cluster spanning a larger area of medial prefrontal cortex.
Subject- and condition-specific signal intensity values extracted from
this cluster did not yield any significant between-groups or between-
conditions differences other than larger responses in controls to money
than face rewards.
Supplementary analyses: ASD vs SAD
To isolate the neural mechanisms of reward processing that may be
specific to SAD relative to ASD, we analyzed models comparing SAD
and ASD only (i.e. without modeling responses in the control group)
via a 2 (Group: SAD, ASD) 2 (Reward type: Money, Faces) mixed
ANOVA applied separately for the anticipatory and outcome phases of
Table 2 Clusters reflecting Group (ASD, SAD, Control) Reward Type (money, faces) interactions during the anticipatory phase of the task and follow-up pairwise t-tests
Region MNI coordinates Z mean P-values Between-groups P-values
Face rewards Money rewards
x y z C-A A-S C-S C-A A-S C-S
Left accumbens 10.41 15 8.07 5.21 0.03 0.85 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.64
Subcallosal cortex 9.55 18.27 11.92 5.14 0.55 0.57 0.30 0.009 0.02 0.54
Right temporal occipital fusiform 26.67 58.93 12.67 5.13 0.44 0.62 0.78 0.93 0.59 0.76
Left lingual gyrus 18.69 55.34 10.93 5.13 0.64 0.99 0.60 0.46 0.18 0.76
Right accumbens 11 8.33 8.50 5.13 0.05 0.74 0.04 0.008 0.01 0.94
Left thalamus 11.43 26.2 0.05 5.17 0.56 0.63 0.91 0.43 0.54 0.76
Right insular cortex 39.2 7.6 0.4 5.07 0.95 0.80 0.84 0.13 0.81 0.12
Right insular cortex 37.73 15.07 0.13 5.12 0.99 0.91 0.92 0.22 0.58 0.51
Right thalamus 9.11 28.67 2 5.13 0.58 0.28 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.79
Left intracalcarine cortex 16.04 69.89 11.37 5.23 0.93 0.98 0.92 0.62 0.51 0.94
Left precentral gyrus 57.20 7.2 7.6 5.15 0.77 0.30 0.42 0.25 0.53 0.73
C-A, controls vs ASD; A-S, ASD vs SAD; C-S, controls vs SAD.
Fig. 4 Brain areas showing significant Group (ASD, SAD, Control) Reward Type (Money, Faces) interactions during the outcome phase of the task. The bar graph depicts parameter estimates by group and
trial type in the significant vmPFC cluster.
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Table 3 Clusters reflecting Group (ASD, SAD, Control) Reward Type (money, faces) interactions during the outcome phase of the task and follow-up t-tests
Region MNI coordinates Z mean P-values Between-groups P-values
Face rewards Money rewards
x y z C-A A-S C-S C-A A-S C-S
Right lingual gyrus 1.29 65.49 5.37 3.29 0.77 0.86 0.90 0.94 0.37 0.54
Right parahippocampal gyrus 24.75 4.4 14.36 2.96 0.16 0.14 0.89 0.12 0.19 0.68
Right fusiform gyrus 41.91 57.49 16.68 3.52 0.88 0.62 0.63 0.75 0.65 0.99
Left amygdala 24.30 3.25 14.63 2.89 0.12 0.25 0.87 0.65 0.21 0.10
Left inferior temporal gyrus 42.27 49.23 17.92 3.72 0.32 0.31 0.83 0.70 0.86 0.61
Right temporal pole 35 18 24.5 2.83 0.10 0.34 0.74 0.20 0.76 0.48
Right temporal fusiform 41 20.5 19 2.6 0.62 0.75 0.79 0.70 0.90 0.65
Left frontal pole 27 59 14 2.82 0.66 0.65 0.96 0.67 0.19 0.16
Left frontal orbital cortex 32.68 30.08 3.56 2.74 0.97 0.51 0.55 0.49 0.67 0.41
Subcallosal cortex 5.07 25.73 4.93 2.66 0.98 0.52 0.59 0.85 0.82 0.98
Right lateral occipital cortex 47 76 4 2.60 0.89 0.27 0.29 0.99 0.58 0.65
Right thalamus 2 20.1 4 2.56 0.81 0.89 0.89 0.85 0.72 0.63
Right cerebral cortex 37.25 60 1.25 2.65 0.39 0.42 0.15 0.62 0.46 0.91
Subcallosal cortex 0.1 19 2 2.6 0.33 0.39 0.86 0.17 0.87 0.12
Right frontal orbital cortex 34.29 29.71 0.86 2.6 0.66 0.08 0.16 0.31 0.88 0.28
Cingulate cortex 3.7 40.32 9.8 2.9 0.57 0.25 0.68 0.62 0.44 0.93
Left precentral gyrus 44.75 6.62 31.33 3.03 0.78 0.55 0.81 0.32 0.68 0.25
Left frontal cortex 44.56 28 2.33 2.63 0.24 0.39 0.80 0.31 0.85 0.43
Left occipital pole 20.67 95.47 3.67 3.31 0.37 0.35 0.99 0.85 0.90 0.93
Right occipital pole 12 96.2 5 2.67 0.27 0.72 0.56 0.70 0.55 0.91
Right middle temporal gyrus 49.7 57.8 8.75 2.77 0.09 0.61 0.41 0.03 0.78 0.10
Left putamen 21.5 5 4 2.55 0.25 0.68 0.49 0.71 0.24 0.50
Left supracalcerine cortex 4.59 86.24 9.18 2.73 0.40 0.53 0.70 0.64 0.17 0.19
Right frontal pole 21.5 26.5 8.5 2.59 0.05 0.06 0.98 0.48 0.52 0.81
C-A, controls vs ASD; A-S, ASD vs SAD; C-S, controls vs SAD.
Fig. 5 Brain areas showing significant Group (ASD, SAD) Reward Type (Money, Faces) interactions during anticipatory (upper panel) and outcome (lower panel) phases of the task. The bar graphs depict
parameter estimates by group and trial type in the significant amygdala clusters. The scatterplot illustrates the significant correlation (r¼ 0.65, P < 0.01) between trait anxiety measured by the STAI-T and
signal intensity during anticipation of social rewards in the left amygdala cluster that differentiated ASD and SAD during face reward anticipation.
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the task, followed up by t-tests on significant clusters. During the
anticipation phase, these analyses revealed no significant interaction
clusters in NAc, but significant interaction clusters in bilateral
amygdala. Follow-up tests on extracted signal intensity values
within these amygdala clusters revealed that during anticipation of
social rewards, SAD subjects activated bilateral amygdala (right:
t[29]¼ 2.11 P < 0.05; left: t[29]¼ 2.09, P < 0.05) significantly more
than the ASD group (see Figure 5 and Table 4). During the out-
come phase, a GroupReward Type analysis revealed no significant
interaction clusters in vmPFC, but once again significant interaction
clusters in bilateral amygdala. Follow-up tests on these amygdala
clusters revealed greater amygdala activation in the SAD group,
relative to the ASD group, to social reward outcomes for both
the right (t[29]¼ 2.18, P < 0.05) and left (t[29]¼ 2.58, P < 0.05)
amygdala.
Relations to anxiety symptom in the SAD group
To examine relations between neural responses to rewards and LSAS
and STAI-T scores in the SAD group, we extracted parameter estimates
from the following: (i) the significant bilateral NAc interaction clusters
yielded by the three-group analysis during the anticipation phase of the
task, (ii) the significant vmPFC interaction cluster yielded by the
three-group comparison during the outcome phase of the task and
(iii) the bilateral amygdala interaction clusters yielded by the
two-group comparison for both anticipatory and outcome phases of
the task. A significant correlation was found between the STAI-T and
activation in the left (r¼ 0.65, P < 0.01) amygdala cluster that differ-
entiated SAD and ASD groups during anticipation of social rewards
(see Figure 5). This relation was not found for the amygdala cluster
that differentiated SAD from ASD during monetary anticipation, sug-
gesting that the correlation between amygdala activity and trait anxiety
in the SAD group was specific to anticipating social rewards. No other
correlations were significant.
COMMENT
Emerging research suggests that dysfunctional reward processing char-
acterizes a range of psychiatric and neurodevelopmental disorders sug-
gesting that altered mesolimbic responses to rewards may be an
Table 4 Clusters reflecting Group (ASD, SAD) Reward Type (money, face) interactions and between-groups t-tests
Region MNI coordinates Z mean P-value
x y z Faces Money
Anticipatory phase
Brain stem 0.97 11.74 24.39 2.61 0.02 0.78
Left hippocampus 21.1 11 19.1 2.38 0.07 0.33
Left fusiform cortex 37.2 43.2 21.6 2.5 0.04 0.84
Right frontal pole 38.67 35.93 17.82 2.7 0.007 0.20
Right middle temporal gyrus 56.86 4.86 18.29 2.5 0.15 0.07
Subcallosal cortex 2.4 6.4 19.2 2.34 0.07 0.06
Right insula 34.43 4.71 16 2.45 0.06 0.55
No label 6.78 10.61 12.78 2.59 0.04 0.48
Left amygdala 24.33 7.39 17.5 2.52 0.02 0.11
Left middle temporal gyrus 45.67 34 4.33 2.38 0.0001 0.12
Posterior cingulated 11.65 32.71 4.59 2.52 0.07 0.96
Right putamen 24.75 9.25 0.5 2.44 0.05 0.32
Right putamen 30.67 0.67 3.56 2.43 0.17 0.66
Right frontal pole 34.31 51.03 16.99 2.81 0.55 0.11
Left frontal pole 25 63.5 7 2.54 0.01 0.13
Right Heschl’s gyrus 42.57 19.71 9.14 2.34 0.25 0.95
Left lateral occipital cortex 47.75 61.75 14.25 2.45 0.07 0.25
Left thalamus 8.06 7.02 16.15 2.61 0.02 0.72
Outcome phase
Left hippocampus 22.31 6.14 22.45 3.58 0.94 0.15
Right fusiform cortex 41.9 51.73 19.13 3.69 0.50 0.31
Brain stem 1.18 14.12 23.76 3.47 0.59 0.02
Left fusiform cortex 40.87 48.53 20.6 3.7 0.50 0.23
Right amygdala 24.7 3.81 22.70 3.5 0.03 0.84
Left amygdala 18.1 6 24.4 3.64 0.04 0.91
Right lingual gyrus 16.24 64.96 8.42 3.63 0.46 0.15
Left lingual gyrus 9.38 58.63 6.25 3.56 0.93 0.66
Brain stem 2.75 33.75 0.5 3.38 0.71 0.31
Right thalamus 2.12 1.53 3.06 3.6 0.24 0.06
Right thalamus 0.69 18.62 8.62 3.51 0.85 0.18
Cingulate gyrus 2.12 37.72 16.4 3.44 0.63 0.16
Right inferior frontal gyrus 48.1 20.75 18.59 3.64 0.01 0.21
Left cuneal cortex 7.81 71.62 21.24 3.4 0.58 0.66
Right cuneal cortex 7.67 80.33 21.33 3.36 0.18 0.08
Posterior cingulate 1.37 20.04 27.45 3.78 0.34 0.29
Right cuneal cortex 1.74 80.52 31.65 3.44 0.28 0.82
Left cuneal cortex 6.17 84.83 35.83 3.58 0.31 0.48
Left precuneus 4.64 77.52 43.36 3.58 0.03 0.40
Right precentral gyrus 46.44 1.11 44.67 3.45 0.12 0.73
Right angular gyrus 53.2 50.8 48.4 3.36 0.35 0.95
Left angular gyrus 51.14 52.29 48.57 3.40 0.72 0.50
Right precentral gyrus 8.5 29.17 60.33 3.41 0.97 0.10
Left fusiform cortex 22 55.1 15.35 3.56 0.23 0.92
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endophenotype that cuts across diagnostic boundaries (Hyman, 2007).
However, research to date has not focused on comparing disorders
characterized by reward circuitry dysfunction to identify common
and unique patterns of the brain activity. The present findings repre-
sent the first study of social and non-social reward processing in SAD
and the first to directly compare reward responses in SAD and ASD.
More broadly, these results suggest that distinct temporal phases of
reward responses (i.e. reward anticipation and outcomes) may drive
unique behavioral phenotypes among disorders with reward process-
ing deficits.
The present results indicate reward network dysfunction in both
ASD and SAD, but that the nature of this dysfunction is related to
the type of reward processed. During reward anticipation, the ASD
group was characterized by NAc hypoactivation during both social
and monetary reward anticipation, whereas SAD was characterized
by NAc hypoactivaton only during social reward anticipation. We
also found that the SAD group demonstrated greater vmPFC activation
to monetary relative to social rewards outcomes and no such effect of
reward type for the ASD group. Thus, for both temporal phases of
reward processing examined, we found that SAD was characterized by
deficits during social reward processing specifically, whereas ASD was
characterized by a more generalized pattern of reward processing
deficits.
Models that compared only SAD and ASD were analyzed to high-
light brain activation that differentiated SAD from ASD specifically.
These analyses revealed no group differences in NAc and vmPFC
during reward anticipation or outcomes. However, there was evidence
of bilateral amygdala hyperactivity in SAD relative to ASD during
social and non-social reward anticipation, and activity in amygdala
clusters that differentiated groups during social reward anticipation
was significantly correlated with trait levels of anxiety within the
SAD group. The amygdala is a central structure for social cognition
(Adolphs, 2010) and is critically involved in reward learning (Shabel
and Janak, 2009) and coding social reward value (Gottfried et al.,
2003). There is a rich literature on the relevance of amygdala dysfunc-
tion to social processing deficits in SAD mainly in the context of threat
(Freitas-Ferrari et al., 2010; Shin and Liberzon, 2010), but this is the
first study to link amygdala dysfunction in SAD to deficits in reward
processing.
The linkage between trait anxiety levels in the SAD group and amyg-
dala activation during anticipation of social rewards suggests that
amygdala function to social rewards may be mechanistically linked
to the expression of anxiety symptoms in SAD. In this regard, we
note that multiple studies have reported anomalous amygdala activa-
tion during face processing in ASD that has been interpreted to con-
tribute to social deficits in ASDs (Pierce et al., 2004; Dalton et al., 2005;
Corbett et al., 2009; Kleinhans et al., 2009). The present findings of
amygdala hyperactivity in SAD relative to ASD suggest that amygdala
dysfunction in social contexts may not be specific to ASD and may
even be less pronounced in ASD than in SAD. Given high rates of
comorbid anxiety disorders in ASD (White et al., 2009) and given
partial phenotypic overlap of social impairments in ASD and SAD, it
is possible that amygdala deficits observed in ASD are a reflection of
certain aspects of social impairments that are common across dis-
orders. If this is the case, comparing multiple groups on different as-
pects of social processing may help uncover deficits specific to different
disorders and thus driving specific impairments. It is noteworthy that
amygdala response during social reward anticipation predicted levels of
anxiety symptoms in the SAD group despite the lack of group differ-
ences with respect to subjective responses to face stimuli. This likely
reflects that amygdala responses predictive of anxiety symptoms were
evident during face anticipation, whereas subjective ratings were col-
lected during faces viewing.
The finding that NAc hypoactivation to social rewards was a
common feature of both ASD and SAD suggests that the social deficits
that are pathognomonic in ASD and SAD may be linked to alterations
in approach-driven motivational processes. If replicated, this may in-
dicate a novel target for mechanistic and treatment research, particu-
larly given that social deficits in SAD are commonly viewed as
manifestations of heightened avoidance motivation rather that defi-
cient approach motivation (Ouimet et al., 2009). When conceptualized
within a developmental experience-dependent perspective, a failure to
experience social stimuli as rewarding at a young age may contribute to
the development of social avoidance. Alternatively, anxiety elicited by
social stimuli may interfere with the processing of social rewards. This
latter explanation seems most plausible for the SAD group where pro-
cessing social rewards was associated with heightened amygdala
activation.
Although the ASD and SAD groups both showed decreased NAc
activation to social rewards, the groups were differentiated on the
basis of NAc responsivity to monetary rewards, suggesting the possi-
bility of a more domain-general pattern of reward network dysfunction
during reward anticipation in ASD relative to SAD. As we have dis-
cussed previously, a pattern of domain-general reward network dys-
function in ASD is a novel conceptualization of social deficits in ASD
(Dichter et al., 2012c) that may provide a potentially parsimonious
account of even non-social deficits (e.g. restricted and repetitive be-
haviors) that characterize the disorder (Dichter et al., 2012b).
This three-group study contains data from individuals with ASDs
and controls previous reported by our research group (Dichter et al.,
2012c). The analytic approaches presented here (i.e. omnibus three-
group models and models comparing only the ASD and SAD groups)
were selected to highlight patterns of similarities and differences across
all three groups and not to repeat ASD-control comparisons presented
previously. However, these models also result in activation clusters that
differed in extent and localization from clusters previously reported
when comparing only the ASD and control groups. Specifically, in
Dichter et al. (2012c) we reported that the ASD group was character-
ized by hypoactivation during monetary but not social reward antici-
pation. In the present analysis (see the bar graphs in Figure 3), the NAc
clusters identified by the omnibus three-group anticipatory analysis
indicate significant differences between ASD and control groups for
both monetary and social reward conditions. We note that the NAc
clusters in Figure 3 are ventral (z-coordinates: Left:8.07; Right:
8.50) to the right NAc cluster presented in Figure 3 of Dichter
et al. (2012c) (z-coordinates: 4), suggesting that the ventral striatum
may possibly show relatively greater sensitivity to social reward antici-
pation deficits in ASD than the dorsal striatum.
Results from the current study should be evaluated in light of meth-
odological limitations. First, some patients in both clinical groups were
taking psychotropic medications, and future studies with
medication-free samples will be needed. Additionally, we used neutral
faces as social rewards because individuals with ASD show impair-
ments at emotional expressions detection impairments (Sasson,
2006), and there is evidence that individuals with SAD may rate neutral
faces as negative (Yoon and Zinbarg, 2008) and may show increased
amygdala activity to neutral faces (Birbaumer et al., 1998; Cooney
et al., 2006). We note that valence and arousal ratings of neutral
faces were equivalent across groups, but future studies may compare
reward system function in SAD and ASD to face rewards with a range
of expressions. We also note that the uneven gender distribution across
groups may have influenced results. Additionally, anxiety symptoms
were not assessed in the ASD group, raising the possibility that shared
neurofunctional features in both clinical groups may be influenced by
the presence of anxiety symptoms in the ASD group. Additionally,
depressive symptoms were not assessed in either clinical group, and
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depression status (Pizzagalli et al., 2009) is known to influence neural
processing of rewards. Given that both ASD (Simonoff et al., 2012) and
SAD (Kessler et al., 1999) have high rates of comorbidities with mood
disorders, this will be an important consideration for future research.
It will also be important in future studies to examine reward-based
brain activation in individuals with comorbid SAD and ASD. A grow-
ing literature supports that anxiety is common in the context of ASD
(White et al., 2009, 2010) and that ASD and SAD may be highly
comorbid, with 29% of children with ASD also meeting criteria for
SAD (Simonoff et al., 2008). The present findings of similarities in
aspects of reward circuitry response to social and non-social rewards
in ASD and SAD may shed light on apparent comorbidity of these
disorders. However, we caution against interpreting the current results
as evidence for ASD-like features in SAD or anxiety-like features in
ASD; rather, these finding appear to reflect shared and distinct neu-
rofunctional markers of social dysfunction in these two disorders.
In summary, this study reports on neural mechanisms of reward
processing deficits in SAD and ASD. Results indicate that both ASD
and SAD are characterized by reward network dysfunction, but that
deficits in ASD may be domain general whereas deficits in SAD may be
specific to social incentives. Although future research will be needed to
assess the clinical and diagnostic utility of these brain activation pat-
terns in patients characterized by social dysfunction, linkages reported
here between neural response to social reward anticipation and anxiety
symptoms in SAD suggest the clinical relevance of addressing SAD
within the context of a social reward processing deficit framework
that highlights the failure to assign reward value to social stimuli.
When considered in light of recent models of ASD pathophysiology
that emphasize reward network dysfunction in response to social and
non-social rewards (Scott-Van Zeeland et al., 2010; Kohls et al., 2011;
Dichter et al., 2012b, 2012c), as well as empirical findings of dysfunc-
tional reward circuitry in a number of psychiatric conditions, includ-
ing substance use disorders (Kalivas and Volkow, 2005), schizophrenia
(Waltz et al., 2009), affective disorders (Hasler and Northoff, 2011)
and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (Cubillo et al., 2012),
mesolimbic responses to rewards appear to be a common endopheno-
type that cuts across diagnostic boundaries and thus an important
intervention target (Hyman, 2007; Insel et al., 2010; Dichter et al.,
2012a).
SUPPLEMENTARY DATA
Supplementary data are available at SCAN online.
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